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ABSTRACT
UN peace operations need a new peacebuilding agenda that acknowledges
both the transboundary nature of conflict drivers and the multipolar nature
of the global order. This means casting aside the current stabilization
approach, but also abandoning the pursuit of liberal peacebuilding of the
unipolar era. Such a conflict transformation agenda would require UN peace
operations to prioritize the rule of law and bottom-up approaches, thus
creating the potential to be embraced by a much broader range of member
states. In this article, we bring liberal peacebuilding critiques into a
discussion with debates on the nature of the global order. Liberal
peacebuilding critiques are rooted in the bottom-up problematization of
international interventions and show what kind of peacebuilding is desirable.
Conversely, the debates on the multipolar nature of the global order expose
the top-down constraints as to what kind of peacebuilding is feasible.
KEYWORDS United Nations; peacekeeping; peacebuilding; multipolar order; rule of law; bottom-up
approaches
At the turn of another decade, something interesting is happening with the
United Nations (UN) flagship activity: peacekeeping. In January 2019, the
UN underwent substantial institutional reform, deprioritizing the term
peacekeeping and subsuming it under a broader umbrella of peace oper-
ations. The former Department of Peacekeeping Operations was restruc-
tured into the Department of Peace Operations and became more closely
integrated with the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs
through shared regional divisions (United Nations, 2019). This reform was
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an attempt to address what the expert community has stressed for over a
decade: That the rigidity of peacekeeping, which necessitates a military
deployment and a state-centric approach, and the stark divisions between
peacekeeping and other types of UN deployments are not appropriate for
contemporary conflicts (Martin, 2010; United Nations, 2015).
Although these bureaucratic reforms were needed, there is concern that
the UN has failed to effectively redress its peacekeeping approach and that
the UN peace operations themselves are in crisis (de Coning, 2021). Missions
are either closing, as in Côte d’Ivoire (2017), Liberia (2018), and Darfur
(2020); are under pressure to scale down, as in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (DRC); or are being reconfigured into Special Political Missions,
as in Haiti (2019). No new multidimensional peace operations have been
established since 2014. As a result, the number of uniformed UN personnel
dropped from around 107,000 in December 2015 to 81,800 in December
2020 (United Nations, 2020a). The contraction of peace operations would
not be problematic if the situation on the ground was improving or this
was an act of “right-sizing” missions, combating the so-called “Christmas
tree mandates,” that is, missions that are overburdened with tasks, reflecting
agendas of multiple actors (Oksamytna & Lundgren, 2021). However, experts
argue that is not the case. This contraction of peacekeeping has been attrib-
uted to increasingly inward-looking policies of key member states, especially
the United States under the Trump administration (Hille, 2020); growing ten-
sions among the five permanent members on the UN Security Council
(UNSC) (Gowan, 2020); the rise of China and the resultant contestation of
the liberal framework underpinning large UN peace operations (Foot,
2020; Fung, 2019; Jones, 2018); decreasing appetite among key troop-contri-
buting countries (Boutellis & Novosseloff, 2017, p. 3); and the increased
ability and legitimacy of regional organizations to substitute the UN as pro-
viders of peace (Gelot, 2012; Schnabel, 2018). UN peace operations are seen to
be in crisis because the UN and multilateralism are in crisis.
These developments are straining UN peace operations, but they do not
endanger the continued relevance of the tool of peacekeeping itself. There
are an ebb and flow to peace operations, but UN peacekeeping has proved
to be remarkably resilient to changes in the global order (Coleman & Wil-
liams, 2021; Peter, 2019). The question is therefore not whether UN peace
operations will continue to exist, but how they will and could look like in
the multipolar order.
To retain their relevance, UN peace operations need to embrace a new
peacebuilding agenda that acknowledges both the transboundary nature of
conflict drivers and the multipolar nature of the global order. This means
breaking with the current approach that prioritizes stabilization and the
extension of state authority (Bellamy & Hunt, 2015; Karlsrud, 2018; Peter,
2015), but also abandoning the pursuit of the liberal peacebuilding approach
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developed during the unipolar era. We build on existing critiques of liberal
peacebuilding to show that a new peacebuilding agenda would require UN
peace operations to abandon the top-down form of the old liberal peace-
building missions while retaining their core substance. Practically, this
stripped-down version of peacebuilding would mean that peace operations
prioritize the rule of law and bottom-up initiatives. Such an agenda is both
normatively desirable—as it incorporates the core critiques of past peace-
building efforts—and feasible—as its congruence with the broadly embraced
Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) initiative (United Nations, 2021) and the Sus-
tainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 (United Nations, 2020c) makes it
acceptable to a wider array of actors.
Theoretically, the article contributes to the literature by bringing liberal
peacebuilding critiques into a discussion with debates on the nature of the
global order. Liberal peacebuilding critiques are rooted in the bottom-up pro-
blematization of international interventions and show what kind of peace-
building is desirable for conflict transformation; with debates on the
multipolar nature of the global order, exposing top-down constraints as to
what kind of peacebuilding is feasible. As a theoretical contribution, we, there-
fore, bring the normative ambitions of the critical peacebuilding literature into
a more problem-solving discussion about the nature of the global order.
We build our argument through two steps, identifying a problem and then
utilizing critical peacebuilding literature to argue for a path forward. In the
first section, we show how the current crisis of multilateralism has trans-
formed UN peace operations, demonstrating that these have all but aban-
doned any conflict transformation ambitions and are now primarily using
stabilization approaches to protect states. We show that this conflict contain-
ment approach is practically unsustainable and normatively undesirable as
contemporary conflict drivers are transboundary. In the second section,
we establish a case for a new peacebuilding agenda for UN peace operations,
arguing that these should prioritize the rule of law and bottom-up
approaches. Such a conflict transformation agenda has the potential to be
embraced by a much broader range of member states, which is increasingly
necessary in a multipolar global order.
UN peace operations and the problem with their current
trajectory
Peace operations have always served the dominant interests of states. In the
late 1940s, UN peacekeeping started as a conflict management tool, designed
to facilitate the de-escalation of inter-state conflicts resulting from decolonia-
lization. In a bipolar world, impartial peacekeepers were deployed to monitor
ceasefires between allies of the United States and the Soviet Union to avoid
direct confrontation between the two superpowers. With the end of the Cold
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War, the UN adapted peacekeeping to help states emerging from civil wars
(Howard, 2007). This change was primarily a reflection of the newly found
consensus within the UNSC and was underpinned by Western normative
ideas. Peacekeepers were asked to assist with elections, reforms of the rule
of law, human rights, and the security sector in addition to the more tra-
ditional monitoring tasks of earlier missions. As the normative agenda pros-
pered under the unipolar order, tasks multiplied (Oksamytna & Lundgren,
2021).
Along with regional organizations and financial institutions, UN peace-
keeping missions became pieces of a broader liberal peacebuilding agenda
(Paris & Sisk, 2009). The underlying logic was that more stable institutions
were a precondition for peace, and this liberal peace approach became the
dominant international response to crises for around 20 years after the end
of the Cold War. For the first time, multilateral operations had an inbuilt
theory of change aiming to transform, not just manage and contain,
conflicts. While the theory promised more than the practice could deliver,
the conflict transformation ambition remains an important goal for sustain-
able peace (Paris, 2010). We return to these debates in the next section, dis-
cussing what form the original agenda is worth adapting for the multipolar
order. In this section, we show that new UN missions have moved in a
different direction with many of the critiques irrelevant to their work.
The nature of global governance has changed substantially over the last
decade, with vast bodies of literature discussing the crisis of multilateralism
and the connected contestation of the authority of international organiz-
ations (Dingwerth et al., 2019; Newman, 2007; Zürn, 2018). According to
Thakur (2020), “almost all countries, especially the major powers, have
instrumentalised international organizations as vehicles for the pursuit of
narrow national interests, rather than maintaining an effective multilateral
order as a global public good in its own right.” Former champions of multi-
lateralism—the United States but also many European states—have their
own complicated relationship with the multilateral system (Layne, 2018),
and China selectively engages and reforms “the rules and norms of existing
institutions to maximize its economic gains in the liberal economic order”
(Feng & He, 2017, p. 24). Consequently, international organizations are
increasingly reduced to the implementation of the lowest common denomi-
nator policies. The UNSC, where five permanent members wield veto power,
is no exception, which has left a profound impact on UN peace operations.
Only 10 years ago, most UN peacekeepers were engaged in implementing
comprehensive peace agreements and building post-conflict institutions—
the core undertaking of so-called liberal peacebuilding. A decade later, all
major UN peace operations are either tasked with limited protection of civi-
lians or with supporting weak governments in their attempts to extend state
authority (Bellamy & Hunt, 2015). While China has become more willing to
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endorse limited protection of civilian mandates (Foot, 2020; Fung, 2019), the
agreement on broader conflict transformation approaches has been more
difficult to find. Multilateral operations built on a theory of change (as
liberal peacebuilding was) require a deeper normative consensus about the
ultimate goal of the exercise. Today, the multipolar nature of the global
order is making it more difficult for the UNSC to agree on a broad
agenda. UN peace operations are therefore becoming reduced to tasks
aimed at conflict containment.
When the UNSC members can agree on a common course, these responses
are increasingly robust, turning UN peace operations into stabilization mis-
sions. Such stabilization is at the expense of peacebuilding (cf. Curran &
Hunt, 2020; Gilder, 2020). Unlike two decades ago, when the goal was to
implement peace agreements, peacekeepers today are primarily assisting
states and their regimes in responding to non-state violent groups seen as anti-
thetical to peace agreements (Peter, 2015, p. 358). Contemporary UN peace
operations are heavily militarized, helping host states achieve military vic-
tories. The most noticeable and talked about mission in this regard has been
the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (MONUSCO), which includes the “first-ever ‘offensive’ combat
force” in UN peacekeeping, the so-called Force Intervention Brigade (FIB)
(United Nations, 2013). Since 2013, FIB has been mandated to assist Congo-
lese forces in fighting all armed groups in the Eastern DRC, with several of
these groups explicitly listed in UNSC resolutions. The United Nations Multi-
dimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) is similarly
supporting offensive actions against violent extremist groups and organized
crime, which in Mali are spearheaded by regional alliances, France, and the
host state. UN peacekeepers are also increasingly relying on advanced military
technologies, from drones to intelligence operations—a development that
highlights not just the scale but also the intensity of their military engagement.
These activities have been criticized for violating core peacekeeping principles,
especially impartiality, as peacekeepers are helping host governments defeat
their enemies (Laurence, 2019; Rhoads, 2016).
Once armed groups have been displaced, UN peacekeepers assist the host
government in its activities to entrench state authority. If the first stage is done
primarily through military means, the second stage involves police and civi-
lian capabilities. The extension of state authority is designed to bolster
often-contested governments and contain conflicts to their regions of
origin. But as the containment of conflict becomes a priority in UNmissions,
peacekeepers become dependent on host governments that dictate the terms
of cooperation while simultaneously lacking capacity to absorb the assistance
offered—a phenomenon known as the fragility dilemma (Bøås et al., 2019).
This results in the failure to provide services and security to the population
or to adequately respond to the root causes of conflicts, thus perpetuating
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the cycle of violence. We have seen this most recently in Mali, which has
experienced sustained protests against the central government precisely for
its unaccountability and lack of service provisions. In addition to the heavy-
handed military operations fueling broader animosity, jihadists have turned
this to their advantage (Osland & Erstad, 2020; United Nations, 2020b). Simi-
larly, in South Sudan UN forces are protecting internally displaced people
(IDP) camps from state security services, while simultaneously depending
on the host state to consent to their presence (Day, 2019).
A number of scholars have analyzed the negative consequences of the turn to
stabilization in recent missions in theDRC,Mali, South Sudan, and the Central
African Republic (Gilder, 2020;Hunt, 2017; Tull, 2018). They highlight how the
close relationship with the host government curtails the possibility for UN
peacekeepers to hold these governments accountable, strengthening illiberal
regimes instead of building stable states able and willing to respond to root
causes of conflict drivers. This is not just normatively problematic but also prac-
tically unsustainable. By siding with one party in a conflict, the UN temporarily
upsets the power balance, resulting in peace settlements that fail to reflect the
political reality on the ground. This in turn complicates longer-term peace-
building and reconciliation processes (Curran & Hunt, 2020). Many of the
armed groups against which the new UN peacekeeping mandates are directed
often enjoywidespread local popular support through theprovisionofbasic ser-
vices or, at minimum because they raise real concerns and grievances that the
local population has against the government. These often relate to transbound-
ary problems such as environmental degradation and resultant famines. If these
groups are displaced, these grievances may be excluded from political settle-
ments (Bøås et al., 2019; Peter, 2015).
Recent developments in UN peace operations have taken a dangerous tra-
jectory. UN peace operations have abandoned the conflict transformation
ambitions of the previous era, instead of focusing on containing conflicts
to their region of origin. This is not only problematic for the regions involved
but also unsustainable as a conflict containment strategy. The nature of
conflict drivers and multipliers today means that neither population flows
nor violence from non-state actors remains limited to contained geographic
areas. While we see liberal peacebuilding as it was practiced during the 1990s
and 2000s as highly problematic and unfeasible in a multipolar order, in the
next section we contend that its pared-down version is the only way to
ensure a radical break with existing policies.
Peacebuilding in a multipolar order: The rule of law and
bottom-up approaches
Liberal peacebuilding is one of the more contested inventions of the inter-
national community in the scholarly literature. While a lot of the critique
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is warranted, we should not throw the proverbial baby out with the bath-
water. Liberal peacebuilding was premised on a solid theory of change,
where accountable institutions providing security and services for people
were deemed a precondition for stability and sustainable peace (cf. Paris,
2010). This theory of change, while deeply flawed in how it was implemented
and no longer actively practiced in UN peace operations, is still engrained in
the thinking of many international actors, making it also the only feasible
way forward in times when multilateralism itself is in crisis. Here we use
liberal peacebuilding critiques to show how the peacebuilding agenda
would need to be adapted to remedy the problems of the original liberal
approach. We then demonstrate that this pared-down and reformed
agenda is in congruence with the broadly embraced A4P initiative and the
SDGs, making it acceptable to a wider array of actors.
Critiques of liberal peacebuilding have focused on two interrelated pro-
blems: its form and its substance. The first core problem with liberal peace-
building is its heavy top-down approach, which influenced the substantive
priorities of missions (Campbell, 2018; Osland & Peter, 2019). As a form,
peace operations have been criticized for being a coercive strategy (Heather-
shaw, 2008, p. 597), for imposing conditionality from above (Chandler, 2004;
Richmond, 2006), for prioritizing international over local expertise, which
coupled with a heavy rotation of international personnel in missions (Autes-
serre, 2014) resulted in a lack of context sensitivity facilitated by blueprint
approaches focused on empowering central governments (Mac Ginty,
2008, p. 145). Such top-down and centralized approaches hinder ownership
and sustainable reforms, and many advances quickly falter when peace oper-
ations draw down (Chesterman, 2007; Donais, 2009). This is an important
critique, which any reform agenda must address seriously.
The second core problem with liberal peacebuilding has been its bloated
agenda, leading scholars to conclude that peacebuilding “reflects the practical
and ideological interests of the global north” (Mac Ginty, 2010, p. 393).
There is merit in this criticism. In the immediate aftermath of the Cold
War, when the normative consensus around liberal values was widely
shared, mandates of peace operations grew exponentially with various
states, donors, and the UN Secretariat adding their preferred recommen-
dations (Oksamytna & Lundgren, 2021). As interested states and donors
most often come from the global north, the bias was ingrained. The top-
down approach contributed to this bloated agenda with peace operations
attempting to implement an impossible range of tasks without a clear
sense of which should be prioritized. In his address to the UNSC in 2018,
the UN Secretary General urged the Council to “put an end to mandates
that look like Christmas trees,” using the example of the mission in South
Sudan, which “cannot possibly implement 209 mandated tasks” (United
Nations, 2019).
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To break with the current prioritization of conflict containment and
return to conflict transformation, both substance and form require rethink-
ing. To ensure their longer-term orientation, UN peace operations need to
return to the rudimentaries of peacebuilding, leaving peripheral tasks to
other actors. Such a streamlined peacebuilding agenda requires prioritizing
the rule of law, with accountability and transparency of host state institutions
supported by UN peacekeepers coming center stage.With a blend of military,
police, and civilian capabilities, UN peacekeepers are uniquely equipped to
assist states in reforming their security, police, and judicial institutions, but
also to hold states accountable in these areas. Reform of these institutions is
essential for host states as they need to adapt their capabilities to handle
some of the more pressing contemporary challenges, such as the urbanization
of violence, transnational organized crime, and violent extremist groups.
Understanding the drivers of violence and distinguishing between—and
being more sensitive toward—the conglomerate of different (in)security
state and non-state actors is essential to avoid drawbacks. At the same time,
a focus on a confined set of tasks would allow peacekeepers to draw clearer
boundaries between their activities and those of the host government. Such
impartiality, as stated in the Capstone doctrine, “should not be confused
with neutrality or inactivity” (United Nations, 2008).
Prioritization of the rule of law is important not just to avoid the pitfalls of
the early incarnation of liberal peacebuilding, but also to gain broader
support for other substantive reforms in host states. However, these
cannot come from above and the broader peacebuilding agenda needs to
reflect the needs of the local population, not the wishes of donors. When
it comes to form, international actors need to step back to allow national
and local processes to work by empowering local peacebuilders. Experts in
both the policy and academic community have identified constituent
elements of current UN peace operations that would benefit from reform
and strengthening, particularly those that encourage greater reliance on
local peacebuilding practices and community engagement (Gilder, 2020;
Mahmoud, 2020; Súilleabháin, 2015). This is not about romanticizing the
local, as some of the earlier critiques of liberal peacebuilding did (cf. Paffen-
holz, 2015), but about acknowledging that institutions and practices devel-
oped locally, nationally, and regionally often enjoy more legitimacy (Gelot,
2012; Schnabel, 2018). While challenges such as insufficient capacity, lack
of resources, and pushbacks will remain, the combination of state insti-
tutions held accountable by UN peacekeepers and local commitment to
bottom-up initiatives could ensure an impetus for peacebuilding in a way
that externally driven initiatives were never able to. In fact, one of the few
positive consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic is the way in which local
peacebuilders and local agency have taken on a new meaning in a situation
where outside experts were unable to travel. The limit to what can be done
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from a distance shifted their dynamic to one of real partners (Mahmoud,
2020). Building on this development seems a good way forward.
The above-streamlined peacebuilding agenda, rooted in existing critiques
of liberal peacebuilding, is not only one that allows for conflict transform-
ation; we also see it as feasible under the current multipolar order. The pro-
posal fits within two broadly supported UN initiatives: A4P and SDGs. The
purpose of the A4P is to “strengthen peacekeeping by spurring collective
action by all peacekeeping stakeholders… through the implementation of
a set of 45 mutually-agreed commitments… across 8 areas” (United
Nations, 2021). Area 6 under this initiative is peacebuilding and sustaining
peace, which includes the rule of law. The SDGs are a collection of 17 inter-
linked global goals designed to be a blueprint to achieve a better and more
sustainable future for all. Within these, SDG 16 aims to “promote peaceful
and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to
justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at
all levels” (United Nations, 2020c). Both of these initiatives enjoy wide
global support and therefore cannot be characterized as a northern or
liberal agenda.
However, these initiatives are umbrella agendas with an inbuilt construc-
tive ambiguity. The challenge, therefore, is the combination of their vague-
ness and their all-embracing nature. While important as framework
documents, we are skeptical whether in the context of UN peace operations
such broad approaches can contribute to stripping the Christmas tree to any
significant extent. A clear prioritization of tasks—with the rule of law taking
center stage—is needed for their successful implementation. This requires a
broad alliance of like-minded actors speaking about the same priority. We
have seen such processes work before under the A4P, where 10 countries
—from both the global north and the global south—have performed broad
consultation on five cross-cutting areas in order to revitalize the diminishing
support for peace operations (United Nations, 2021). An alliance focused on
a single and broadly acceptable priority has more purchase in persuading
others to commit politically and economically, than a cacophony of voices
each advancing its boutique item.
Conclusion
The current crisis of multilateralism represents a unique opportunity to forge
a new path for UN peace operations. The combination of fewer resources to
fund multilateral missions, continued competition between global and
regional powers, and less consensus on the broader liberal normative
agenda implies a direction towards a more pragmatic era for UN peace oper-
ations (de Coning & Peter, 2019; Moe & Stepputat, 2018). To gain the
support of broader membership, UN peace operations will not be able to
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pursue the enlarged agendas of the liberal peacebuilding era. As critiques of
liberal peacebuilding show, this is not a bad thing. This pragmatic era,
however, does not need to continue with stabilization mandates and could
again incorporate a more substantive peacebuilding agenda with a conflict
transformation potential.
UN peace operations have proven resilient to changes in the global order.
The state of multilateralism today makes it easy for member states to con-
tinue on the current path of the lowest common denominator, prioritizing
conflict containment over more ambitious agendas. Bureaucracies, especially
the size of the UN, are also not good at changing directions or stepping back
to allow for bottom-up approaches to work. However, contemporary chal-
lenges disregard borders and require multilateral cooperation. Thus, a new
framework is needed. Based on critiques of liberal peacebuilding, our argu-
ment is two-fold. First, UN peace operations need to focus on a peacebuild-
ing agenda prioritizing the rule of law, with a central focus on accountability
and transparency of host state institutions. Second, peace must be built from
below. There is simply no way around this. This is not an easy agenda to
achieve. However, the congruence of our proposal with two broadly
endorsed initiatives—A4P and SDGs—and the fact that similarly focused
initiatives have been successful in the past makes it a feasible one.
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